Does an Oligopolistic Primary Market Matter? The Case of an Asian Housing Market by Tang, Edward Chi Ho et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Does an Oligopolistic Primary Market
Matter? The Case of an Asian Housing
Market
Edward Chi Ho Tang and Charles Ka Yui Leung and Joe
Cho Yiu Ng
Hong Kong Shue Yan University, City University of Hong Kong,
City University of Hong Kong
June 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93680/
MPRA Paper No. 93680, posted 8 May 2019 11:59 UTC
1 
Does an Oligopolistic Primary Market Matter? The Case of an Asian Housing 
Market1 
 
Edward C. H. Tang2 
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, Hong Kong Shue Yan 
University, North Point, Hong Kong, email: chtang@hksyu.edu 
 
Charles K. Y. Leung 
Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong 
Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, email: kycleung@cityu.edu.hk 
 
Joe C. Y. Ng 
PhD candidate, Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong 
Kong, Kowloon Tong, email: joecyng-c@my.cityu.edu.hk 
 
This version: June 2018 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper takes advantage of the oligopolistic structure of the Hong Kong primary 
housing market and examines whether the time-variations of the market concentration 
are caused by or cause the variations of the local economic factors. The analysis also 
takes into consideration of the changes of the U.S. variables and commodity prices, 
which arguably may represent changes in the construction cost. We find clear evidence 
of time-varying responses of housing market variables to macroeconomic variables. 
Policy implications and directions for future research are also discussed. 
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…The extremely large number of homebuilders nationwide certainly makes the 
construction industry look competitive. The 1997 Economic Census reports almost 
140,000 firms in the single-family construction business. There is concentration in the 
industry, but it is not dominated by only a handful of companies, as there were over 
seventeen hundred firms with revenues in excess of $10 million annually. There are 
many fewer builders of apartment complexes, but the same data source indicates over 
seventy-five hundred firms in the sector. At least for big cities such as New York, there 
is no evidence of control by a few firms…. 
 
Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko, Rethinking Federal Housing Policy, 2008, p.52 
 
…In particular, to the extent that construction firms have some degree of monopoly 
power, we will mistake monopolistic price setting for government-created barriers to 
entry. However, all the available evidence suggests that the housing production industry 
is highly competitive… The multifamily housing industry is only slightly less 
concentrated. In 1997, there were 7,544 establishments in this industry and more than 
1,000 in New York State alone. According to County Business Patterns, over 100 such 
establishments were headquartered in Manhattan, with another 329 elsewhere in New 
York City. Nearly two-thirds of the multi-family builders in Manhattan were relatively 
small enterprises with fewer than 10 employees; nearly three-quarters of all such 
enterprises in New York City have fewer than 10 employees. Because this is not an 
industry controlled by a few large firms, it is highly unlikely that there is any monopoly 
power with which to set prices…. 
 
Edward Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko and Raven Saks, Why is Manhattan so Expensive, 
2005, p.337. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Introduction 
 
Does an oligopolistic market matter? For non-durable goods, the Economics literatures 
have provided much theoretical works and evidence that it does (for instance, Tirole, 
1988; Waldman and Jensen, 2012). In the case of durable goods, the situation may be 
different. As goods are durable, we need to separate the primary from the secondary 
market. Once we make such distinction, we also recognize that the primary market 
buyers could re-sell their goods in the secondary market in the future. In other words, 
from the perspective of a primary market seller, customers today could become 
competitors tomorrow. Would the potential “threats” of the secondary market constrain 
the pricing, and potentially other behaviors, of the primary market producers? In a 
seminal paper, Coase (1972) argues that it is the case and that leads to a large theoretical 
literature on the topic. 
 
Clearly, to empirically test the importance of an oligopolistic primary market, we need 
to address several questions. First, we need to identify goods with an oligopolistic 
primary market. Second, we would ask why the primary market is oligopolistic in the 
first place. Third, we would like to take into account the factors that both drive the 
primary market to be oligopolistic and affect the price in the whole market. Therefore, 
to evaluate whether the “concentration” of the primary market has an effect on the price, 
we would need to “separate” the effect of the market structure from other “exogenous 
factors”. Recently, Chen et al (2013) calibrate a structural model of US automobile 
market, which is clearly oligopolistic in the primary market, and find that the net effect 
of opening the secondary market would suppress the profit of new car manufacturers 
as much as 35 percent. It is then natural to ask whether the same is true for housing, 
which is also a durable consumption goods and arguably being at least as important as 
automobile, and has an important secondary market as automobile.3 Unfortunately, the 
importance of an oligopolistic primary market may not be easily tested with the U.S. 
housing data. As reflected by the quotations, Glaeser and Gyourko (2008), Glaeser et 
al (2005), among others, it is not easy to find a city in which a few developers dominate 
the primary market. In addition, Somerville (1999) suggests that homebuilders in 
United States should be treated as monopolistically competitive suppliers of 
differentiated products, where the builder size and concentration vary across different 
MSA. Thus, it may be controversial to identify a housing market in U.S. whose primary 
market is oligopolistic in the first place. 
 
This paper attempts to address the importance of an oligopolistic housing market in an 
Asian city, namely Hong Kong. In 2013, there are 34 major private developers listed in 
Hong Kong. In addition, the Urban Renewal Authority, which is a quasi-government 
                                                     
3 Among others, Stein (1995) argues that secondary market transactions typically dominate the primary 
ones in the housing market. 
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profit making body, is also active in the market [Table 1]. In this paper, we define the 
developers’ market share as the percentage of total gross floor area completed, and we 
find that these 35 developers could take more than 90% of the total [Figure 1a].4 More 
importantly, the market share of top 10 developers can be as high as 80% [Figure 1b]. 
Thus, the housing market of Hong Kong provides us a natural platform to study the 
effect of an oligopoly structure of primary market. 
 
Other features of the Hong Kong economy may provide further justifications for the 
study. For instance, there is neither capital control nor capital gains tax in the Hong 
Kong housing market. During our sampling period, the nominal exchange rate between 
the U.S. dollar and Hong Kong dollar has remains fixed, and foreign investors receive 
equal treatment as domestic ones. All these features facilitate the possibility of arbitrage 
by domestic and foreign investors. In addition, Hong Kong does not practice fiscal 
federalism. Public goods provision (such as public schools, police, etc.) is financed by 
the overall budget of the Hong Kong government rather than local property tax. Most 
residents in Hong Kong are broadly-defined Chinese. All these factors mitigate certain 
incentives behind segregation and hence simplify the analysis.5 
 
Traditionally, the existence of an oligopolistic primary housing market in Hong Kong 
is attributed to the land scarcity of Hong Kong. According to the CIA World Factbook 
(2012), for each square kilometers of land in Hong Kong, it hosts 6,480 people, which 
is the second densest country in the world [Figure 2]. On top of that, only 7% of land 
is used for residential purposes, hence actually the living environment is even more 
crowded [Figure 3]. To host such an amount of population, an obvious solution is to 
build high-rise buildings6. Unlike detached houses in United States, which may take 
several months to complete, it is normal to spend more than three years to complete a 
residential project in Hong Kong. Starting from land auction7, to site investigation and 
foundation, and finally superstructure and completion8 , it requires huge amount of 
human resources and capital. That may create an implicit barrier for other firms to enter 
the market. Table 1 shows that the market capitalization of the top four developers, 
including SHK, CKH, HEN and NWD, ranges from HK$79 billion to HK$329 billion. 
 
 
                                                     
4 Clearly, there are other alternative measurements. Unfortunately, total gross floor area is the only 
variable commonly reported in all listed developer annual reports. Hence, we recognize the limitation 
and restrict our attention to this measure. 
5  Among others, see Hanushek and Yilmaz (2007) show how fiscal federalism would change the 
locational choices of economic agents and hence the equilibrium rent gradient. 
6 In United States, condominium developers compete with multifamily counterparts for a piece of land 
[Cypher and Hayunga (2010)]. However, it usually occurs in Hong Kong that the developers compete a 
piece of land through an auction, and then build condominiums on it. 
7 Ching and Fu (2003) show that the Hong Kong land market is imperfectly contestable. 
8 In the multi-stage construction process, Spiegel (2001) shows that developers acquire land when 
expected housing returns lie above the rate of interest, and develop when housing returns lie below. 
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Table 1 Major Property Developers in Hong Kong 
Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
Property Developers 
(Top 10 developers are marked with *) 
Abbreviations Stock 
Code 
Market Capitalization 
as at 7 Jan 2015 (HKD) 
Hutchison Whampoa Property * HUT 0013 368,994,741,009 
CITIC CITIC 0267 338,187,134,895 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited * SHK 0016 329,159,467,650 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited * CKH 0001 294,152,870,926 
China Overseas Land and Investment Ltd. COL 0688 203,531,990,099 
MTR Corporation MTR 0066 183,478,517,681 
Wharf Holdings Limited * WH 0004 172,717,257,639 
Henderson Land Development Co Ltd * HEN 0012 160,368,130,240 
Hang Lung Properties Limited * HL 0101 95,312,575,488 
Swire Pacific A SW 0019 89,290,040,100 
New World Development * NWD 0017 79,151,411,398 
Wheelock Properties  WHEEL 0020 74,467,276,369 
Sino Land * SINO 0083 74,466,645,920 
Chinese Estates Holdings Limited CEH 0127 48,835,048,422 
Hang Lung Group HLG 0010 46,880,171,173 
New World China Land Limited NWCL 0917 42,644,340,367 
Kerry Properties Limited  KP 0683 40,592,507,707 
China Resources CR 0291 39,371,400,819 
PCCW PCCW 0008 38,831,055,614 
Hysan Development Company Limited * HYS 0014 37,288,702,805 
Hopewell Holdings Limited * HOPE 0054 25,309,964,170 
K. Wah International KW 0173 11,873,106,790 
Shun Tak Holdings Limited STH 0242 11,013,726,142 
Kowloon Development Company Limited KDC 0034 10,632,294,981 
Emperor International EMP 0163 6,388,890,574 
Hong Kong International Limited HKR 0480 5,266,070,031 
Tai Cheung Holdings Limited TCH 0088 3,933,675,177 
Lai Sun Development LSD 0488 3,631,383,685 
SEA Holdings SEA 0251 3,606,888,987 
Hong Kong Ferry (Holdings) Co Ltd HKF 0050 2,985,575,140 
Asia Standard International ASI 0129 2,237,373,982 
Y. T. Realty YTR 0075 1,886,955,499 
Chuang’s Consortium International Ltd. CCI 0367 1,623,274,633 
Tai Sang Land Development TSLD 0089 1,098,898,162 
Urban Renewal Authority (quasi-government 
profit making statutory body) 
URA --- --- 
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Figure 1a Market Share of the Major Real Estate Developers in Hong Kong 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 1b Market Share of the Top 10 Developers in Hong Kong 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 2 Densities of the Countries (People per Square Kilometers of Land) 
 
Source: CIA World Factbook (2012) 
 
Figure 3 Share of Land Used for Residential Purpose and Population 
 
Source: Census and Statistics Department 
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The analytical part of the paper is conducted in two steps. First, we need to measure the 
“market concentration” of the primary housing market. Following the literature on 
Industrial Organization, a simple measure is the Herfindahl Index (HI),9 which is 
widely used in the literature. For examples, Ye et. al (2009) synthesizes four 
concentration methods (including HI as one of them) and proposes a model for 
measuring the intensity of competition in the international construction market; and 
Beck et al (2012) uses the HI to measure the degree of concentration in the real estate 
brokerage industry across different cities in the US. Compiling the data from Buildings 
Department as well as developers’ annual reports, we can compute the quarterly HI 
from 1995 – 2013. 
 
Second, we examine the dynamic interactions among the Herfindahl Index, other 
indicators of the housing market (e.g. housing price index and housing supply), 
macroeconomic variables of Hong Kong (e.g. GDP and stock price), and other variables 
that are exogenous to Hong Kong (e.g. US factors and international commodity prices) 
[Figure 4]. As there are a large number of time series, we follow Bernanke et al (2005) 
to use Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive Models (FAVAR), which combines the 
standard VAR with factor analysis. It allows us to summarize the large amounts of 
information about the economy by a relatively small set of estimated factors. In addition, 
due to the large dimensionality of the VAR, Bayesian approach is preferred [Banbura 
et al. (2010)]. As a whole, we employ a Time-Varying Bayesian FAVAR model, which 
allows the parameters to change over time.  
 
Figure 4 Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. It first provides a general picture of the 
                                                     
9 Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the literature. Among others, see Djolov (2013) 
and the reference therein.  
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major real estate developers in Hong Kong. Next, it highlights the changes in 
concentration of developers’ market through constructing the Herfindahl Index. Then, 
it studies the dynamic interactions by applying FAVAR model. Implications will be 
made at the end of the paper. 
 
Data 
We employ data from 1996Q3 to 2016Q2 in quarterly frequency. The details about the 
raw data and their short forms are provided in the Appendix. All data employed in the 
VAR model are seasonally adjusted. Except for those in percentage or contain 
zero/negative value, all data are transferred into log scale. Also, they are normalized to 
zero mean and unit variance which is necessary for the principal component analysis 
decriable in the next section. 
 
Methodology 
 
To study the dynamic interactions between housing variables in Hong Kong, we employ 
a two-step FAVAR model (Stock and Waston, 2002a b). Figure 5 summarizes the 
structure of the FAVAR model. First, we extract 2-32 frequency cycles from housing 
variables, GDP and other macro-variables in Hong Kong by using band-pass filter 
developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). In order to capture the idea that housing 
variables can be induced by internal as well as external factors, we then extract 2-32 
frequency cycles from macro-variables in the U.S. and commodity prices. 
We envision a world that Hong Kong is affected by external factors which are 
represented by macro-variables in the U.S. and commodity prices but not vice versa. 
Therefore, there is a one-way causality from macro-variables in the U.S. and 
commodity prices to variables in Hong Kong. However, there are too many macros and 
commodity prices variables. Including all of them in the VAR system is not feasible. 
We, therefore, conduct principal component analysis on those variables and include 
only the important components (PCs) in the VAR system.  
 
Formally, the “structural form” of the FAVAR model is: 
 
𝐵0𝑋𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐾𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
+
𝑝
𝑗=1
𝑤𝑡            (1) 
 
The vectors 𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑡 = [𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆1,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆2,𝑡 … 𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑛,𝑡] ′  and 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡 =
[𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑀1,𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑀2,𝑡 … 𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑚,𝑡] ′ , where  𝑛  and 𝑚  are the numbers of principal 
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components extracted from macro-variables in the U.S. and commodity prices, 
respectively. 𝑋𝑡 = [𝑅𝐻𝐼𝑡 𝑅𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑡  𝑅𝐻𝑆𝐼𝑡 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  𝑉𝐴𝑡 𝑅𝐼𝑡 𝑀𝑅𝑡 𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐾1,𝑡 … 𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐾𝑠,𝑡]′ , 
where 𝑠 is the number of principal components extracted from other macro-variables 
in Hong Kong. 𝐵0 has a unit diagonal, and 𝑤𝑡 is the residual term, while the reduced 
form of the FAVAR model is then modeled as: 
 
   𝑋𝑡 = ∑ 𝜑𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜃𝑖𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 +
𝑝
𝑗=1 ∈𝑡        (2)    
                 
where ∈𝑡 ~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝛴∈)  is 𝑘 × 1  vectors, {𝜑𝑗}  are 𝑘 × 𝑘  matrices, {𝜃𝑖}  and 
{𝜏𝑖} are 𝑘 × 𝑛 and 𝑘 × 𝑚 matrices, 𝑋𝑡 is a 𝑘 × 1 vectors of endogenous variables, 
∈𝑡 and 𝛴∈ are the innovation of reduced form VAR and variance-covariance matrix, 
respectively. 𝑝 is the maximum number of lags which is equal to one.  
 
The interactions among 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑃𝐶𝑡 depend on 𝐵0 in equation (1). Unfortunately, 
we can only estimate equation (2) and hence are unable to recover 𝐵0 with traditional 
econometric methods. The conventional approach is to assume some form of block-
recursive structure in 𝐵0.
10 However, as explained in Leeper et al. (1996) and others, 
some of those assumptions might have economic interpretations and hence an assumed 
block-recursive structure might have precluded certain types of economic dynamics 
that are of interest. Instead, we follow the sign restriction approach proposed by Ouliaris 
and Pagan (2016), known as SRC approach (sign restriction with generated 
coefficients).11 Here we provide a brief description of the SRC approach. Based on 
equation (1) and (2), it can be shown that 𝛴∈ = 𝐵0
−1Σ𝑤𝐵0
−1′ , where Σ𝑤  is the 
variance-covariance matrix of 𝑤𝑡. Based on this simple equation, the SRC approach 
would first draw above-diagonal elements of 𝐵0 at random such that sign restrictions 
on 𝐵0  are satisfied. Then we solve for remaining elements of 𝐵0  and diagonal 
elements of Σ𝑤  and retain the resulting candidate solution for 𝐵0  if all sign 
restrictions on 𝐵0  are satisfied. The procedure for drawing the above-diagonal 
elements of 𝐵0 is as follows. First, for each of the 𝑏𝑖𝑗,0 element in 𝐵0, where 𝑖 < 𝑗, 
we draw a random variable 𝜑 from the uniform distribution 𝑈(−1,1). Then 𝑏𝑖𝑗,0 is 
set to be 𝜑/(1 − |𝜑|). Given the above-diagonal elements of 𝐵0 and the innovation 
of reduced form VAR 𝛴∈, the below-diagonal elements of 𝐵0 can be solved by using 
a nonlinear equation solver or the instrumental variable method as discussed in Ouliaris 
and Pagan (2016).  
                                                     
10 Among others, see Christiano et al. (1999).  
11 Ouliaris and Pagan use simulation data to compare the performance of SRC and the traditional SRR 
approach (sign restriction recombination). Experiments show that there seems to be a slightly better fit 
to the true values by SRC, although both methods work well. They conclude that SRC has some 
advantages over SRR: it applies to any simultaneous equations system and can incorporate a wider range 
of information e.g. on both the parameters and impulse responses. 
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We follow Towbin and Weber (2015) to identify the signs of a housing demand, housing 
supply, mortgage rate and price expectation shock. In addition, we identify a market 
structure shock by placing positive signs on the responses of NHI and RHPI. The reason 
is simple. When the market structure becomes more concentrate, the market power of 
developers increases. Other things being equal, they would set a higher price to gain 
more profits. We restrict only the first period after the shock. Table 3 provides the details 
of the sign restriction. As we are interested in some structural shocks only, our model 
is referred as a partially identified VAR model in literature.  Our approach is that we 
impose the sign pattern of each of the unidentified shock is different from that of the 
identified shock. We retain 1000 draws for the impulse response analysis. 
 
Tables 3 Sign Restricition 
 
Shock Housing supply  Housing demand  Mortgage rate  Price expectation  Market structure 
NHI         + 
RHPI +  +  +  +  + 
VA -  -    +   
RI -  +  +  +   
MR   +  -  +   
 
12 
Figure 5 Structure of the FAVAR Model 
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Results 
 
We first present the results of the principal component analysis. Table 4 shows the 
summary statistic of the principal component analysis. Taking in mind the trade-off 
between explanation power of the PCs and the degree of freedom in the VAR system, 
we retain the first 4 PCs of other macro-variables in Hong Kong as they explain two 
third of the variations. Similarly, we retain 2 and 4 PCs of macro-variables in the U.S. 
and commodity prices as they explain more than 60% of the variations. 
 
Second, we discuss some interesting results from the impulse response functions of 
different shocks (Figure 6 - 10). It is interesting to see that RGDP response negatively 
to housing demand, mortgage rate and price expectation shocks but positively to 
housing supply and market structure shocks. The sign of RHPI in the former shocks are 
identified due to an upward shift of the housing demand curve (i.e. a positive housing 
demand shock increase demand for housing; a negative mortgage rate shock stimulates 
demand for housing due to a decrease in mortgage rate; a positive price expectation 
shock stimulates current demand for housing since people tend to buy housing units 
now rather than later when the price goes up). The results suggest that when the 
economy is hit by these “demand-side shocks”, households may tend to reduce 
consumption and increase saving in order to fulfill the need for housing. This, in turn, 
lowers the RGDP. On the other hand, housing supply and market structure shocks are 
“supply-side shocks” and they lead to positive responses of RGDP. This may be 
related to wealth effect of housing. In sum, our results suggest that whether the wealth 
effect of housing exists depends on the sources of shocks which lead to an increase in 
housing prices. The “supply-side shocks” tend to produce a wealth effect of housing. 
 
Furthermore, it is clear that the responses of NHI also depend on whether the shocks 
are “demand side” or “supply side” shocks. NHI responses negatively to “demand side” 
shocks but positively to “supply-side shocks”. This is readily comprehensible. The 
market power of developers increases when the “supply side” shocks reduce the supply 
of housing, and hence, a positive response of NHI. On the other hand, the “demand side 
shocks” lead to an increase in residential investment (see Table 3). When the future 
supply of housing increases, the market power of developers tends to fall. 
 
Finally, since the signs of RPHI in all the shocks are restricted to be positive, we are 
able to compare the magnitude of the responses of RHPI across difference shocks. The 
14 
peak responses of RHPI to a housing demand, housing supply, mortgage rate, price 
expectation and market structure shock are 5.7%, 11.8%, 15.3%, 6.7% and 8.4%, 
respectively. This suggests that mortgage rate and housing supply are important drivers 
of changes in RPHI. The market structure shock identified in this paper, which is 
peculiar to similar studies, is ranked at third. This implies changes in market structure 
could also lead to substantial changes in RHPI. 
 
Conclusion  
 
(to be added) 
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Table 4 Principal Component Analysis Summary Statistic 
 
Other macro-variables in Hong Kong 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 4.09 1.24 0.27 0.27 
Comp2 2.86 1.3 0.19 0.46 
Comp3 1.55 0.2 0.1 0.57 
Comp4 1.36 0.12 0.09 0.66 
Comp5 1.24 0.41 0.08 0.74 
Comp6 0.82 0.07 0.05 0.79 
Comp7 0.75 0.15 0.05 0.84 
Comp8 0.61 0.14 0.04 0.89 
Comp9 0.46 0.14 0.03 0.92 
Comp10 0.32 0.06 0.02 0.94 
 
Macro-variables in the U.S. 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
     
Comp1 50.32 34.2 0.46 0.46 
Comp2 16.12 5.56 0.15 0.61 
Comp3 10.56 6.35 0.1 0.71 
Comp4 4.2 0.45 0.04 0.75 
Comp5 3.75 0.43 0.03 0.78 
Comp6 3.32 0.4 0.03 0.81 
Comp7 2.93 0.55 0.03 0.84 
16 
Comp8 2.38 0.39 0.02 0.86 
Comp9 1.99 0.61 0.02 0.88 
Comp10 1.38 0.16 0.01 0.89 
 
Commodity prices 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
     
Comp1 8.13 4.86 0.3 0.3 
Comp2 3.27 0.56 0.12 0.42 
Comp3 2.7 0.72 0.1 0.52 
Comp4 1.98 0.13 0.07 0.60 
Comp5 1.85 0.36 0.07 0.66 
Comp6 1.49 0.18 0.06 0.72 
Comp7 1.31 0.15 0.05 0.77 
Comp8 1.17 0.23 0.04 0.81 
Comp9 0.94 0.26 0.03 0.85 
Comp10 0.67 0.13 0.03 0.87 
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Figure 6 Housing Demand Shock 
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Figure 7 Housing Supply Shock 
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Figure 8 Mortgage Rate Shock 
 
 
 
20 
Figure 9 Price Expectation Shock 
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Figure 10 Market Structure Shock 
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Appendix 
 
Hong Kong data (1996 Q3 – 2016 Q2) 
 
Variable Abbreviation Source 
Normalized Herfindahl Index NHI Authors’ calculation 
Market share of all listed developers MSALL Authors’ calculation 
Market share of top 4 developers MS4 Authors’ calculation 
Real housing price index RHPI RVD 
Real money supply – M0  MS0 HKMA 
Real money supply – M1  MS1 HKMA 
Real money supply – M2  MS2 HKMA 
Real building works tender price index RBWTPI ASD 
Unemployment rate  UR CSD 
Real Hang Seng Index RHSI HKEX 
Real stock market trading value  RSMTV HKEX 
Real wage index RW IMF 
Real GDP  RGDP CSD 
Trade ratio TR CSD 
Real retail sales RSALES CSD 
Tourist arrival TOUR CSD 
Number of IPO NO_IPO HKEX 
Real dollar value of IPO RD_IPO HKEX 
Volatility of HSI daily return VTY HKEX 
Vacancy rate VA RVD 
Residential new loan approved NL HKMA 
Real prime rate RPR HKMA 
Real 1-month HIBOR RHIBOR HKMA 
CPI CPI CSD 
Residential investment RI Authors’ calculation 
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Key: 
ASD = Architectural Services Department 
CSD = Census and Statistics Department 
HKEX = Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited 
IMF = International Monetary Fund 
RVD = Rating and Valuation Department 
 
 
 
US Data description (1996 Q3 – 2016 Q2) 
 
Variable Abbreviation Source 
Personal income (USD bn, saar) PI BEA 
Personal current transfer receipts (USD bn, saar) PCTR BEA 
Retail sales (USD mn, sa) RS USCB 
Industrial production index – Total index (2007 = 100) IPI FRB 
Industrial production index – Final Product & Nonindustrial 
Supplies (2007 = 100) 
IPIFPNS FRB 
Industrial production index – Final Product (2007 = 100) IPIFP FRB 
Industrial production index – Consumer Goods (2007 = 100) IPICG FRB 
Industrial production index – Durable consumer goods  
(2007 = 100) 
IPIDCG FRB 
Industrial production index – Non-Durable consumer goods 
(2007 = 100) 
IPINDCG FRB 
Industrial production index – Fuels (2007 = 100) IPIF FRB 
Industrial production index – Residential Utilities  
(2007 = 100) 
IPIRU FRB 
Industrial production index – Equipment (2007 = 100) IPIE FRB 
Industrial production index – Materials (2007 = 100) IPIM FRB 
Industrial production index – Durable goods materials 
(2007 = 100) 
IPIDGM FRB 
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Industrial production index – Non-durable goods materials 
(2007 = 100) 
IPINDGM FRB 
Industrial production index – Manufacturing (SIC) 
(2007 = 100) 
IPIMFG FRB 
NAPM production Index  NAPMPI ISM 
Capacity utilization (%, sa) CU FRB 
Civilian Labor Force: Employed, Total (thousand, sa) CLFT BLS 
Civilian Labor Force: Employed, Nonagricultural Industries 
(thousand, sa) 
CLFNI BLS 
Unemployment rate (sa) UR BLS 
Unemployment: average duration (weeks, sa) UD BLS 
Unemployment: by duration: persons unemployed for less than 
5 weeks (thousand, sa) 
UP5 BLS 
Unemployment: by duration: persons unemployed for 5 to 14 
weeks (thousand, sa) 
UP14 BLS 
Unemployment: by duration: persons unemployed for more 
than 15 weeks (thousand, sa) 
UP15 BLS 
Unemployment: by duration: persons unemployed for 15 to 26 
weeks (thousand, sa) 
UP26 BLS 
Unemployment: by duration: persons unemployed for more 
than 27 weeks (thousand, sa) 
UP27 BLS 
Average weekly initial claims of unemployment insurance 
(thousand, sa) 
UI USDL 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Total private (sa) EP BLS 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Goods producing (sa) EGP BLS 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Mining (sa) EM BLS 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Construction (sa) EC BLS 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Manufacturing (sa) EMFG BLS 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Durable goods (sa) EDG BLS 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Non-durable goods (sa) ENDG BLS 
Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Service providing (sa) ESP BLS 
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Employees on nonfarm payrolls: Trade, transportation and 
utilities (sa) 
ETTU BLS 
Employees of nonfarm payrolls: Wholesale trade (sa) EWT BLS 
Employees of nonfarm payrolls: Retail trade (sa) ERT BLS 
Employees of nonfarm payrolls: Financial activities (sa) EFA BLS 
Employees of nonfarm payrolls: Government (sa) EG BLS 
Average weekly hours: Goods producing (sa) AWHGP BLS 
Average weekly hours: Manufacturing overtime hours (sa) AWHMOH BLS 
Average weekly hours: Manufacturing AWHM BLS 
NAPM employment index NAPMEI ISM 
Private housing units started (thousand, saar) HS USCB 
Private housing units started: Northeast (thousand, saar) HSNE USCB 
Private housing units started: Midwest (thousand, saar) HSMW USCB 
Private housing units started: South (thousand, saar) HSS USCB 
Private housing units started: West (thousand, saar) HSW USCB 
Private housing units authorized (thousand, saar) HA USCB 
Private housing units authorized: Northeast (thousand, saar) HANE USCB 
Private housing units authorized: Midwest (thousand, saar) HAMW USCB 
Private housing units authorized: South (thousand, saar) HAS USCB 
Private housing units authorized: West (thousand, saar) HAW USCB 
Purchasing managers’ index PMI ISM 
New orders index NOI ISM 
Supplier deliveries index SDI ISM 
Inventories index INI ISM 
Manufacturers’ new order: Consumer goods (USD mn) MNOCG USCB 
Manufacturers’ new order: Durable goods industries (USD 
mn) 
MNODGI USCB 
Manufacturers’ new order: Nondefense capital goods (USD 
mn) 
MNONCG USCB 
Manufacturers’ unfilled orders: Durable goods industries 
(USD mn) 
MUODGI USCB 
28 
Money supply: M1 (USD bn, sa) MONE FRB 
Money supply: M2 (USD bn, sa) MTWO FRB 
Money supply: Base money (USD bn) MBM IMF 
Depository institutions reserves: Total (USD mn) DIRT FRB 
Depository institutions reserves: Non-borrowed (USD mn) DIRNB FRB 
Consumer credit outstanding: Non-revolving (USD bn, sa) CCO FRB 
S&P 500: Composite (1941-43 = 100) SP RS 
S&P 500: Industrial (1941-43 = 100) SPI S&P 
S&P 500: Dividend yield SIDY RS 
Federal funds rate (% pa) FFR FRB 
Commercial paper rate (% pa) CPR FRB 
US Treasury Bills: 3 months (% pa) TBTHREE FRB 
US Treasury Bills: 6 months (% pa) TBSIX FRB 
US Treasury constant maturities: 1 year TCMONE FRB 
US Treasury constant maturities: 5 years TCMFIVE FRB 
US Treasury constant maturities: 10 years TCMTEN FRB 
Corporate bond yield: Aaa (% pa) CBYAAA FRB 
Corporate bond yield: Baa (% pa) CBYBAA FRB 
Spread: CPR - FFR SCPR FRB 
Spread: TBTHREE – FFR STBTHREE FRB 
Spread: TBSIX – FFR STBSIX FRB 
Spread: TCMONE – FFR  STCMONE FRB 
Spread: TCMFIVE – FFR  STCMFIVE FRB 
Spread: TCMTEN – FFR  STCMTEN FRB 
Spread: CBYAAA – FFR  SCBYAAA FRB 
Spread: CBYBAA – FFR  SCBYBAA FRB 
Real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100) REERI BIS 
Real exchange rate: Switzerland (US$ per Swiss Franc) FXSWISS FRB 
Real exchange rate: Japan (US$ per Yen) FXJAPAN FRB 
Real exchange rate: United Kingdom (US$ per pound) FXUK FRB 
Real exchange rate: Canada (US$ per Canadian $) FXCAN FRB 
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Inflation rate: All items (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPI BLS 
Inflation rate: Apparel (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPIA BLS 
Inflation rate: Transport (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPIT BLS 
Inflation rate: Medical care (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPIMC BLS 
Inflation rate: Commodities (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPIC BLS 
Inflation rate: Durables (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPID BLS 
Inflation rate: Services (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPIS BLS 
Inflation rate: All items less food (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPILF BLS 
Inflation rate: All items less shelter (1982 – 1984 = 100, sa) CPILS BLS 
Inflation rate: All items less medical care (1982 – 1984 = 100, 
sa) 
CPILMC BLS 
Average hourly earnings: Good producing (USD, sa) AHEGP BLS 
Average hourly earnings: Construction (USD, sa) AHEC BLS 
Average hourly earnings: Manufacturing (USD, sa) AHEM BLS 
Consumer confidence index: Expectations (1985 = 100) CCIE CB 
CBOE volatility index VIX CBOE 
 
Key: 
BEA = Bureau of Economic Analysis 
USCB = US Census Bureau 
FRB = Federal Reserve Board 
ISM = Institute of Supply Management 
BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics 
USDL = US Department of Labor 
S&P = Standard & Poor’s 
RS = Online data provided by Robert Shiller (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm) 
BIS = Bank of International Settlements 
DAT = Datastream 
CB = Conference Board 
CBOE = Chicago Board Options Exchange 
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Commodities data (1996 Q3 – 2016 Q2) 
 
Variable Abbreviation Source 
Aluminum  ALU Datastream 
Beef BEEF IMF 
Copper COP Datastream 
Cotton COT Datastream 
Gold GOLD Datastream 
Iron IRON Datastream 
Lead LEAD IMF 
Nickel NICKEL IMF 
Rice RICE Datastream 
Sugar SUGAR Datastream 
Wheat WHEAT Datastream 
Wool WOOL IMF 
Zinc ZINC Datastream 
Crude oil COIL Datastream 
Natural gas NGAS Datastream 
Coal COAL Datastream 
Cement CEM Datastream 
Corn CORN Datastream 
Pulp PULP Datastream 
Silver SILVER Datastream 
Lamb LAMB IMF 
Soft Logs SLOGS IMF 
Hard logs HLOGS IMF 
Fish FISH IMF 
Hard Sawnwood HWOOD IMF 
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Soft Sawnwood SWOOD IMF 
Potash POT IFS 
 
